Abstract. In this paper, we propose several selective-identity chosen-ciphertext attack secure identity based key encapsulation (IB-KEM) schemes that are provably secure under the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) assumption in the standard model. Our schemes compare favorably to previous results in efficiency. With delicate modification, our schemes can be strengthened to be full-identity CCA secure easily.
Decryption only returns K if the ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) is consistent, i.e., e(C 1 , X t X ) = e(g, C 2 )∧e(C 1 , F (I)) = e(g, C 3 ). In all other cases it rejects and returns ⊥. We defer the detailed construction and security proof to Section 3.
In what follows, we give a brief explanation of our strategy to achieve indistinguishability of ciphertext under selective-identity CCA attack (IND-sID-CCA) from two aspects, one is how to obtain selective-identity CCA security, and the other is how to reduce it to the CBDH assumption.
We first give the intuition behind the CCA security. From the attacker's view, the second part of the ciphertext C 2 = (X t X ) r prohibits an adversary from modifying a valid ciphertext in a meaningful way. From the challenger's view, the consistency of ciphertext is publicly verifiable, i.e., anyone could check the consistency of ciphertext with the help of bilinear map. Therefore any inconsistent ciphertext will be rejected. On the other hand, in the simulation all consistent ciphertexts can be classified into the following three types. Type-1 ciphertext is the one whose t value differs to t * of the challenge ciphertext. Type-2 ciphertext is the one encrypted under an identity different from the challenge identity I * . Type-3 ciphertext is exactly the challenge ciphertext. The reduction algorithm is able to decrypt all the consistent ciphertexts correctly by implementing dual all-but-one technique: set X := X −t * g d to implement the all-but-one technique (with respect to t = t * ) to decrypt Type-1 ciphertexts (t = t * ); set F (I) := X I−I * g z to implement the all-but-one technique (with respect to I = I * ) to extract a private key for all identities but the challenge identity I * , thus to be able to decrypt Type-2 ciphertexts (I = I * ). Type-3 ciphertext (I = I * ∧ t = t * ) is not allowed to be queried according to the definition of selective-identity chosen ciphertext security model. To summarize, the reduction algorithm can handle all the decryption queries correctly.
We then give our basic idea about how to reduce the IND-sID-CCA security to the CBDH assumption. Note that the indistinguishable type security notion is essentially defined as a decisional problem. Considering the gap between decisional problems and computational problems, it would be difficult to directly reduce the IND-sID-CCA security to the CBDH assumption.
A natural approach is to find a stepping stone. More specifically, we first reduce the IND-sID-CCA security to some decisional assumption related to the CBDH assumption, then reduce the decisional assumption to the CBDH assumption. In this way the IND-sID-CCA security can be finally reduced to the CBDH assumption. We provide more details as follows. We select the Goldreich-Levin version decisional BDH (GL-DBDH) assumption [HJKS10] as the stepping stone, which states that there is no PPT algorithm that can distinguish the two distributions ∆ bdh = (g, A, B, C, K, R) and ∆ rand = (g, A, B, C, U, R). Here (g, A, B, C) are the inputs of a BDH problem, K is the output of a Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate with bdh(A, B, C) and randomness R as input while U is a bit sampled from {0, 1} uniformly random. Suppose a reduction algorithm B is asked to solve the GL-DBDH problem. B simulates a real attack game of Scheme 0 by embedding A into X, embedding B into Y , and embedding C into one part of the challenge ciphertext. We demonstrate that if there exists an IND-sID-CCA adversary A that can break the CCA security of Scheme 0, then B can break the GL-DBDH assumption. The GL-DBDH assumption can be thus reduced to the CBDH assumption according to the Goldreich-Levin theorem. Therefore, the IND-sID-CCA security of Scheme 0 is finally reduced to the CBDH assumption.
We note that Scheme 0 bears a close resemblance to the IB-KEM scheme [KG06] . The key difference between the two schemes is the derivation of the symmetric key. In [KG06] the Encap algorithm directly uses a BDH seed as a symmetric key, while in Scheme 0 the Encap algorithm uses the Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate to derive a 1-bit symmetric key from a BDH seed.
Note that the element (X t X ) r and F (I) r in the ciphertext share the same randomness r, thus it is possible to further shrink the public parameters size and the ciphertext size. By using a technique similar to [KV08] , the ciphertext can be reduced to two group elements at the cost of adding one group element in the private key and resorting to a stronger assumption, named the modified CBDH assumption. We denote the resulting scheme by Scheme 0 . The concrete construction and security proof are included in Appendix A.
A Scheme with constant size public parameters. To encapsulate a n-bits symmetric key, we can follow the standard multiple encapsulations method: perform the 1-bit IB-KEM n times using independent random coins. We denote the resulting scheme by Scheme 1 and describe it as follows.
Setup : mpk = (g, h, X = g a , X , Y ), msk = a KeyGen : sk = (Y a F (I) s , g s ) Encap : C = (C 1 , . . . , C n ), where C i = (g r i , (X t X ) r i , F (I) r i ) with t = TCR(C i,1 , . . . , C n,1 ).
We defer the detailed construction and security proof to Section 4.
A Scheme with constant size ciphertext. In contrast to the multiple encapsulations method used in Scheme 1, we may also adopt the randomness-reusing technique: include n group elements (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) into mpk (instead of a solo group element Y in previous schemes), then generate n BDH seeds using a single randomness r with respect to n different bases e(X, Y i ).
We denote the resulting scheme by Scheme 2 and describe it as follows.
We defer the detailed construction and security proof to Section 5.
Generalized Scheme 1. Scheme 1 enjoys the constant-size mpk but its ciphertext size is linear in n, while Scheme 2 enjoys the constant-size ciphertext but its mpk size is linear in n. It is interesting to know if there exists a trade-off between mpk size and ciphertext size. From the above two schemes, it is easy to see that when generating n pair-wise independent BDH seeds, the roles of Y i and the randomness r j are exchangeable. With this observation, we propose the following generalized scheme that offers a trade-off between mpk and ciphertext. We denote it by Scheme 3 and described it as follows. The detailed construction and security proof are deferred to Section 6.
In the above generalized scheme, (Y 1 , . . . , Y n 1 ) are n 1 independent elements from G. When performing encapsulation, the Encap algorithm picks n 2 = n/n 1 independent random integers (r 1 , . . . , r n 2 ) from Z p , then mix-and-match them to generate n pair-wise independent BDH seeds of the form e(X, Y i ) r j . If we set n 1 = n 2 = √ n, the yielding scheme has mpk of O( √ n) group elements and ciphertext of O( √ n) group elements. Scheme 1 and Scheme 2 can be viewed as special cases of the generalized scheme with the parameter choice (n 1 = 1, n 2 = n) and (n 1 = n, n 2 = 1), respectively. Interestingly, we find that the above trade-off method can naturally apply to the KEM schemes proposed in [HK08, Wee10, HJKS10] and the IB-KEM scheme presented in [Gal10] . Particularly, when implementing the trade-off method to the KEM scheme presented in [HJKS10, Section 3], the resulting scheme is exactly the one constructed by Liu et al.
[LLLJ11].
Generalized Scheme 2. Observe that one BDH seed bdh(A, B, C) is determined by three inputs, then mpk and ciphertext can be further shrunk to O( 3 √ n) group elements by using the mix-and-match method twice. More precisely, instead of generating the BDH seed like e(X, Y i ) r j as the above generalized scheme, we can generate the BDH seeds of the form e(Y i , Y j ) r k . That is, first self mix-and-match the set (Y 1 , . . . , Y n 1 ), then mix-and-match the resulting n 1 (n 1 − 1)/2 bases e(Y i , Y j ) (i = j) with n 2 random integers (r 1 , . . . , r n 2 ). The self mix-and-match method is better than the "implicitly defining" method used in [HJKS10, Section 5.3] since it travels all the binary combinatorial pairs (Y i , Y j ) over the set (Y 1 , . . . , Y n 1 ), thus it can generate the same number of bases with smaller mpk. Based on this observation, we propose another generalized scheme called Scheme 4 as follows. The detailed construction and security proof are deferred to Section 7.
To generate n pair-wise independent BDH seeds we require that n = n 1 (n 1 − 1)n 2 /2. Let n 1 = n 2 , then the public parameters and the ciphertext are both of O( 3 √ n) groups elements. Not surprisingly, this trade-off technique can also apply to the KEM scheme [HJKS10, Section 5.3] and the IB-KEM scheme [Gal10] . 
In Scheme 3 we have n = n1n2, then n1 and n2 can be set to integers around O( √ n). In Scheme 4 we have n1(n1 − 1)n2/2, then n1 and n2 can be set to integers around O( 3 √ n). 
However, we remark that a private key for
, where F (I) is the Boneh-Boyen hash. Besides, the master secret key of their scheme is still a bit large (2 √ n elements from Z p ), which may render it less practical in use. Regarding to this, it would be very interesting to construct IBE schemes with short master secret key while provably secure under weak assumptions in the standard model.
Preliminaries

Notation
We use standard asymptotic notation O and o to denote the growth of functions. We denote with poly(κ) an unspecified function f (κ) = O(κ c ) for some constant c. We denote with negl(κ) an unspecified function f (κ) such that f (κ) = o(κ −c ) for every constant c. Throughout the paper, a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm is a randomized algorithm that runs in time poly(κ). For a positive integer n, we denote with [n] the set [n] = {1, . . . , n}. For a finite set S, we use s R ← − S to denote that s is sampled from the set S uniformly at random.
Identity based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
An identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (IB-KEM) [BFMLS08] consists of four PPT algorithms as follows:
Setup: takes the security parameter 1 κ as input and outputs the public parameter mpk and the master secret msk. Intuitively, mpk is the system parameters which will be public known, while the msk will be known only to the thrusted third party, called Private Key Generator. KeyGen: takes mpk, msk, an identity I as input and outputs the associated private key sk. Encap: takes mpk and an identity as input and outputs a pair (C, K) where C is the ciphertext and K ∈ K is a data encryption key.
Decap: takes mpk, private key sk, and a ciphertext C as input and outputs the data encryption key K ∈ K.
We require that if (mpk, msk) R ← − Setup(1 κ ), sk ← KeyGen(mpk, msk, I), and (C, K) ← Encap(mpk, I) then we have Decap(mpk, sk, C) = K.
Chosen Ciphertext Security
CCA-security of an IB-KEM is defined by the following game playing between an adversary A and a challenger CH.
Setup. CH takes a security parameter 1 κ and runs the KeyGen algorithm. It gives the adversary the resulting system parameters. It keeps the master key to itself. Phase 1. A may make polynomially-many private key queries and decapsulation queries. CH answers these queries by running the algorithm KeyGen to extract the associated private keys. Challenge. Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over it outputs an identity I * on which it wishes to be challenged. The only constraint is that I * did not appear in any private key extraction query in Phase 1. CH computes (C * , K * 0 ) = Encap(mpk, I * ), samples K * 1 uniform randomly from K. Finally, CH picks a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and sends (C * , K * β ) as the challenge to the adversary. Phase 2. A issues more private key queries with the restriction that I = I * and the decapsulation queries with the restriction that I, C = I * , C * . Guess. Finally, A outputs a guess β ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if β = β .
We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-ID-CCA adversary. We define adversary A's advantage over the IB-KEM scheme E by Adv
, where κ is the security parameter. The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary. Selective-identity CCA-security [CHK04] can be defined in a similar game as the above game of full-identity CCA-security, except that the adversary needs to output a target identity at the very beginning of the game. We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-sID-CCA adversary. We define adversary A's advantage over the IB-KEM scheme E by Adv
where κ is the security parameter. The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary. 
Target Collision Resistant Hash Function
Note that TCR is a weaker requirement than collision-resistance, so any practical collisionresistant function can be used. To simplify notation we will drop the superscript s and simply use TCR hereafter. Additionally, we can define multi-inputs TCR function in a natural way, that is TCR
The corresponding tcr-advantage of an adversary H is defined in a similar way except substituting c with (c 1 , . . . , c n ) and c * with (c * 1 , . . . , c * n ).
Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let G be a cyclic group generated by g and equipped with a bilinear map e :
The computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) problem is computing the value bdh(A, B, C) given random A, B, C ∈ G. The CBDH assumption asserts that the CBDH problem is hard, that is, Pr[A(A, B, C) = bdh(A, B, C)] ≤ negl(κ) for all PPT algorithms A.
In the bilinear setting, the Goldreich-Levin theorem [GL89] gives us the following lemma for a Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate f gl :
Lemma 2.3 Let G be a prime order group generated by g equipped with a pairing e :
Let U R ← − {0, 1} be uniformly random. Suppose there exists a PPT algorithm B distinguishing the distributions ∆ bdh = (g, A, B, C, K, R) and ∆ rand = (g, A, B, C, U, R) with non-negligible advantage. Then there exists a PPT algorithm computing bdh(A, B, C) on input (A, B, C) with non-negligible success probability, hence breaking the CBDH problem.
We assume that the global public parameters known to all the parties consist of the pairing parameters (e, G, G T , g, p) ← GroupGen(1 κ ), the descriptions of a target collision resistant hash function TCR and a suitable Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate f gl (·, R) with randomness R to extract one pseudorandom bit from a BDH seed. It is well known that an IB-KEM scheme compares favorably to an IBE scheme in many ways [CS01, BFMLS08] , and IB-KEM schemes can be readily bootstrapped to full functional IBE schemes by coupling with a DEM having appropriate properties. Therefore in this paper, we focus on the constructions of IB-KEM.
A 1-bit IB-KEM Scheme
In this section we describe an 1-bit IB-KEM which is obtained by extending the techniques of [HJKS10] to the Boneh-Boyen IBE scheme [BB04]. The resulting IB-KEM scheme is INDsID-CCA secure based on the CBDH assumption. It is defined as follows. 
Decap. To decapsulate ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) under identity I, first compute t = TCR(C 1 ). If e(C 1 , X t X ) = e(g, C 2 ) or e(C 1 , F (I)) = e(g, C 3 ) then return ⊥. Take the private key sk and the ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) as input and outputs K = f gl e(C 1 ,sk 1 ) e(C 3 ,sk 2 ) , R . Indeed, for a valid ciphertext, we have
Notice that the consistency of the ciphertext is publicly verifiable, i.e., anyone can verify a ciphertext being consistent or not.
Theorem 3.1 Let TCR be a target collision-resistant hash function and suppose that the CBDH assumption holds in G. Then the above scheme is an IND-sID-CCA secure IB-KEM.
Proof. We proceed in a sequence of games. We write (C * 1 , C * 2 , C * 3 ) to denote the challenge ciphertext with the corresponding key K * of identity I * , denote with U * the random key chosen by the IND-sID-CCA experiment, and set t * = TCR(C * 1 ). Let W i denote the event that A outputs β such that β = β in Game i.
Game 0. This is the standard IND-sID-CCA game. By definition we have
Game 1. Let E 01 be the event that the adversary issues a decapsulation query I * , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 with C 1 = C * 1 in Phase 1. Note that the probability that the adversary submits a decapsulation query such that C 1 = C * 1 before seeing the challenge ciphertext is bounded by Q d /p, where Q d is the number of decapsulation queries issued by A.
We define Game 1 exactly the same as Game 0 except assuming that E 01 never occurs in Game 1. It follows that
Moreover, we remark that in Phase 2 a decapsulation query I * , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 will be rejected if C 1 = C * 1 . Since if C 2 = C * 2 or C 3 = C * 3 , the decapsulation query will be rejected for the inconsistency of the ciphertext. If C 2 = C * 2 and C 3 = C * 3 , it will be rejected by definition of IND-sID-CCA game. Game 2. Let E 12 be the event that the adversary issues a decapsulation query I * , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 with C 1 = C * 1 and TCR(C 1 ) = TCR(C * 1 ). By the target collision resistance of TCR, we have Pr[E 12 ] ≤ negl(κ). We define Game 2 exactly the same as Game 1 except assuming that E 12 never occurs in Game 2. It follows that
We claim that
We prove this statement by letting an adversary against the GL-DBDH assumption simulate the challenger in Game 2. B is given a challenge instance (g, A, B, C, L, R), where L is either randomly sampled from {0, 1} or f gl (bdh(A, B, C), R). B plays the game with an adversary A against the IND-sID-CCA security of the 1-bit IB-KEM scheme. Initialization. A first outputs an identity I * ∈ Z p that it intends to attack.
t * = TCR(C). B picks z R ← − Z p and defines h = X −I * g z . It gives A the public parameters mpk = (g, h, X, X , Y ). The corresponding msk, which is unknown to B is a. The function F is essentially of the form
Phase 1 -Private Key Queries. A issues up to Q e private key queries with the only restriction that I = I * . To respond to a private query for identity I ∈ Z p , B generates sk as follows:
for sk algorithm B picks s R ← − Z p and sets
It is easy to see that sk is a valid random private key for I since
I−I * = g s where s, s are uniform in Z p . This matches the definition for a private key for I. Hence, sk is a valid private key for I. Phase 1 -Decapsulation Queries. Upon A issuing a decaptulation query I, C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , B responds as follows. If I = I * , B uses the corresponding private key to handle it. Otherwise, B computes t = TCR(C 1 ) and tests the consistency of the ciphertext by checking
If the equality holds, B sets K := f gl (e( X, Y ), R). It is easy to see that the decapsulation result is correct by observing
. By the definition of Game 2 we know that when I = I * , if C 1 = C * 1 then we have t = t * . Therefore B can answer all decapsulation queries issued by A correctly. Challenge. B sets C * 1 = C (which implicitly assigns r = c), C * 2 = C d , and
Note that this is a consistent ciphertext since we have (X t * X ) r = (g d ) r = C d and F (I * ) r = (g z ) r = C z . Then B sets K * = L and gives A the challenge (C * , K * ). Phase 2. In Phase 2, all the queries are responded in the same way as in Phase 1 except the decapsulation query I * , C * will be rejected.
This finishes the description of simulation. It is easy to see that B simulates the challenger perfectly. If A's advantage is not negligible, then B has non-negligible advantage against the GL-DBDH problem. According to Lemma 2.3, B further implies an algorithm with non-negligible advantage against the CBDH problem, which contradicts to the CBDH assumption. Therefore, we prove the statement. The theorem follows by combining (1)-(4).
CCA Secure IB-KEM with Constant Size Public Parameters
In this section we present a n-bit IB-KEM scheme based on the 1-bit IB-KEM scheme using multiple encapsulations method.
Setup. The same as Scheme 0. KeyGen. The same as Scheme 0.
, where
then return ⊥. Take the private key sk = (sk 1 , sk 2 ) and the ciphertext C = (C 1 , . . . , C n ) as input and output
Indeed, for a valid ciphertext, we have
Theorem 4.1 Let TCR be a target collision-resistant hash function and suppose that the CBDH assumption holds in G. Then the above scheme is an IND-sID-CCA secure IB-KEM.
The security is somewhat straightforward by conducting the hybrid argument with the proof of Scheme 0. For completeness we put the proof in Appendix B.
CCA Secure IB-KEM with Constant Size Ciphertext
In this section we present a n-bit IB-KEM scheme based on the 1-bit IB-KEM scheme using the randomness-reuse technique. 
Encap. Pick r R ← − Z p , then generate the ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) as C 1 = g r , C 2 = (X t X ) r with t = TCR(C 1 ), and C 3 = F (I) r . Compute K = (K 1 , . . . , K n ), where
Decap. To decapsulate ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) under identity I, first compute t = TCR(C 1 ). If e(C 1 , X t X ) = e(g, C 2 ) or e(C 1 , F (I)) = e(g, C 3 ) then return ⊥. Take the private key sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) and the ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) as input and output
Notice that the consistency of the ciphertext is publicly verifiable, i.e., anyone could verify a ciphertext being consistent or not.
Theorem 5.1 Let TCR be a target collision-resistant hash function and suppose that the CBDH assumption holds in G. Then the above scheme is an IND-sID-CCA secure IB-KEM.
The security is somewhat straightforward by conducting the hybrid argument with the proof of Scheme 0. For completeness we put the proof in Appendix C.
Generalized Scheme 1
In this section we present the first generalized scheme which shows that there exists a trade-off between the ciphertext size and the public parameters size. We assume that n is the product of n 1 and n 2 . The generalized scheme is defined as follows.
Setup. The same as Scheme 2 except we substitute n with n 1 . KeyGen. The same as Scheme 2 except that we substitute n with n 1 . Encap. Pick r 1 , . . . , r n 2 R ← − Z p , and set C j,1 = g r j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 . Set t = TCR (C 1,1 , . . . , C n 2 ,1 ), C j,2 = (X t X ) r j , C j,3 = F (I) r j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 . The ciphertext is C = (C 1 , . . . , C n 2 ) where C j = (C j,1 , C j,2 , C j,3 ). Compute the symmetric key K = (K 1 , . . . , K n ), where
Decap. To decapsulate ciphertext C = (C 1 , . . . , C n 2 ) encrypted under identity I, first compute t = TCR (C 1,1 , . . . , C n 2 ,1 ). If e(C j,1 , X t X ) = e(g, C j,2 ) or e(C j,1 , F (I)) = e(g, C j,3 ) for some j ∈ [n 2 ] then return ⊥. Take the private key sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk n 1 ) and C = (C 1 , . . . , C n 2 ) as input and output
Particularly, let n be a perfect square and n 1 = n 2 = √ n, we obtain an IB-KEM scheme with O( √ n) public parameters size and O( √ n) ciphertext size.
Theorem 6.1 Let TCR be a target collision-resistant hash function and suppose that the CBDH assumption holds in G. Then the above scheme is an IND-sID-CCA secure IB-KEM.
The security is somewhat straightforward by conducting the hybrid argument with the proof of Scheme 0. For completeness we put the proof in Appendix D.
Generalized Scheme 2
In this section we present the second generalized scheme. We assume that n = n 1 (n 1 − 1)n 2 /2.
Setup. mpk and msk are given by
KeyGen. To generate a private key sk = (sk ij ) for an identity I ∈ Z p , pick s ij R ← − Z p and set sk ij = (g y i y j F (I) s ij , g s ij ) for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n 1 .
Encap. Pick r 1 , . . . , r n 2 R ← − Z p , and set C k,1 = g r k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n 2 . Set t = TCR (C 1,1 , . . . , C n 2 ,1 ), C j,2 = (X t X ) r j , C j,3 = F (I) r j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 . The ciphertext is C = (C 1 , . . . , C n 2 ) where
). Compute the symmetric key K = (K i,j,k ), where
Decap. To decapsulate ciphertext C = (C 1 , . . . , C n 2 ) encrypted under identity I, first compute t = TCR(C 1,1 , . . . , C n 2 ,1 ). If e(C k,1 , X t X ) = e(g, C k,2 ) or e(C k,1 , F (I)) = e(g, C k,3 ) for some k ∈ [n 2 ] then return ⊥. Take the private key sk = (sk ij ) and C = (C 1 , . . . , C n 2 ) as input and output
, R where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n 1 and 1 ≤ k ≤ n 2 .
Theorem 7.1 Let TCR be a target collision-resistant hash function and suppose that the CBDH assumption holds in G. Then the above scheme is an IND-sID-CCA secure IB-KEM.
The proof is similar to that of Scheme 1 in Section 4, Scheme 2 in Section 5, and Generalized Scheme 1 in Section 6, except that for a given CBDH challenge instance (A, B, C) the reduction algorithm first sets Y i = A for some i ∈ [n 1 ] then sets X = A h for a random chosen exponent h instead of directly setting X = A as before. For the limit of space, we omit the details here.
Extensions
Since BB 1 -IBE [BB04] and Waters-IBE [Wat05] share the same commutative-blinding framework, thus we can enhance our IB-KEM schemes with only selective-identity security to IB-KEM schemes with full-identity security by using the Waters-IBE as the underlying IBE scheme. The security proofs are somewhat straightforward by composing the proofs for IB-KEM schemes in Section 4, 5, and 6 based on BB 1 -IBE and the proofs for Waters-IBE [Wat05, KG06] . For a concrete example, we sketch the proof of Scheme 1 * , which is the resulting scheme of replacing the underlying IBE scheme of Scheme 1 with Waters-IBE, as follows. The proof is conducted by a sequence of games. Game 0 is the standard IND-ID-CCA game. Game 1 is defined like Game 1 except that the reduction algorithm will terminate the simulation due to regular abort or artificial abort. Game 2, Game 3, and Game 4 are defined like Game 1, Game 2, and Game 3 in the proof for Scheme 1, respectively. The argument of the indistinguishability between Game 3 and Game 4 is similar to that between Game 2 and Game 3 in the proof for Scheme 1. Then the security result immediately follows.
In this section we describe a variant of Scheme 0 with shorter mpk and ciphertext at the cost of relying on a slightly strong assumption, named the modified computational bilinear DiffieHellman assumption.
A.1 The Modified Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let G be a cyclic group generated by g and equipped with a bilinear map e : G × G → 
Encap. Pick r
Decap. To decapsulate ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 ) under identity I, first compute t = TCR(C 1 ). If e(C 1 , F (I)Y t ) = e(g, C 2 ) then return ⊥. Otherwise, take the private key sk and C = (C 1 , C 2 ) as input, compute K = f gl e(C 1 , sk 1 sk t 3 )e(C 2 , sk 2 ), R . Indeed, for a valid ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 ), we have
Theorem 1.2 Let TCR be a target collision-resistant hash function and suppose that the mCBDH assumption holds in G. Then the above scheme is an IND-sID-CCA secure IB-KEM.
Proof. We proceed in a sequence of games. We write (C * 1 , C * 2 ) to denote the challenge ciphertext with the corresponding key K * of identity I * , denote with U * the random key chosen by the IND-sID-CCA experiment, and set t * = TCR(C * 1 ). Let W i denote the event that A outputs β such that β = β in Game i.
Game 1. Let E 01 be the event that the adversary issues a decapsulation query I * , C 1 , C 2 with C 1 = C * 1 in Phase 1. Note that the probability that the adversary submits a decapsulation query such that C 1 = C * 1 before seeing the challenge ciphertext is bounded by Q d /p, where Q d is the number of decapsulation queries issued by A. Since Q d = poly(κ), we have Pr[E 01 ] ≤ Q d /p ≤ negl(κ). We define Game 1 exactly the same as Game 0 except assuming that E 01 never occurs in Game 1. It follows that
Moreover, we remark that in Phase 2 a decapsulation query I * , C 1 , C 2 will be rejected if C 1 = C * 1 . Since if C 2 = C * 2 , the decapsulation query will be rejected for the inconsistency of the ciphertext. If C 2 = C * 2 , it will be rejected by definition of IND-sID-CCA game. Game 2. Let E 12 be the event that the adversary issues a decapsulation query I * , C 1 , C 2 with C 1 = C * 1 and TCR(C 1 ) = TCR(C * 1 ). By the target collision resistance of TCR, we have Pr[E 12 ] ≤ negl(κ). We define Game 2 exactly the same as Game 1 except assuming that E 12 never occurs in Game 2. It follows that
We prove this statement by letting an algorithm B against the GL-mDBDH assumption simulate the challenger in Game 2. Suppose B is given a challenge instance (g, A, B, B , C, L, R), where L is either uniform randomly sampled from {0, 1} or f gl (mbdh(A, B, B , C), R). B plays Game 2 with an adversary A against the IB-KEM scheme as follows. Initialization. A first outputs an identity I * ∈ Z p that it intends to attack.
Setup. B picks d
R ← − Z p , and then sets
gives A the public parameters mpk = (g, h, X, Y ). The corresponding msk, which is unknown to B is a. The function F is essentially of the form
Phase 1 -Private Key Queries. A issues up to Q e private key queries with the only restriction that I = I * . To respond to a private query for identity I ∈ Z p , B generates sk as follows: pick a random integer s ∈ Z p and sets
It is easy to see that sk is a valid private key for I since Phase 1 -Decapsulation Queries. Upon A issuing a decaptulation query I, C 1 , C 2 , B responds as follows. If I = I * , B uses the corresponding private key to handle it. Otherwise, B computes t = TCR(C 1 ) and tests the consistency of the ciphertext by checking
If the above equality holds, B sets K := f gl (e( Y , X), R). It is easy to verify that the answer is correct by observing that
By Game 2 we know that when I = I * , if C 1 = C * 1 then t = t * . Therefore B can answer all decapsulation queries issued by A correctly. Challenge. B sets C * 1 = C (which implicitly assigns r = c), and C * 2 = C d . The challenge ciphertext is C * = (C * 1 , C * 2 ). Note that this is a consistent ciphertext since we have (F (I * )Y t * ) r = (g d ) r = C d . Then B sets K * = L and gives A the challenge (C * , K * ). Phase 2. In Phase 2, all the queries are responded in the same way as in Phase 1 except the decapsulation query I * , C * will be rejected.
This finishes the description of simulation. It is easy to see that B simulates the challenger perfectly. If A's advantage is not negligible, then B has non-negligible advantage against the GLmDBDH problem. According to Lemma 2.3, B further implies an algorithm with non-negligible advantage against the mCBDH problem, which contradicts to the mCBDH assumption. Therefore, we prove the statement. The theorem follows by combining (5)-(8).
We compare Scheme 0 and Scheme 0 in Table 2 . Scheme 0 can be extended to n-bits IB-KEMs in an analogous way as we did to Scheme 0. Proof. We proceed in a sequence of games. Let (C * 1 , . . . , C * n ) be the challenge ciphertext of the corresponding key K * under I * , denote with U * the random key chosen by the IND-sID-CCA experiment, and set t * = TCR(C * 1,1 , . . . , C * n,1 ). We start with a game where the challenger proceeds like the standard IND-sID-CCA game (i.e., K * is a real key and U * is a random key), and end up with a game where both K * and U * are chosen uniformly random. Then we show that all games are computationally indistinguishable under the CBDH assumption. Let W i denote the event that A outputs β such that β = β in Game i.
Game 1. Let E 01 be the event that the adversary issues a decapsulation query I * , C 1 , . . . , C n with C i,1 = C * i,1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n in Phase 1. Note that the probability that the adversary submits a ciphertext such that C i,1 = C * i,1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n before seeing the challenge ciphertext is bounded by Q d /p n , where Q d is the number of decapsulation queries issued by A. Since
We define Game 1 like Game 0 except assuming that E 01 never occurs in Game 1. It follows that
Moreover, we remark that in Phase 2 a decapsulation query I * , C 1 , . . . , C n will be rejected if
for some i ∈ [n], the decapsulation query will be rejected for the inconsistency of the ciphertext. If C i,2 = C * i,2 and C i,3 = C * i,3 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it will be rejected by definition of IND-sID-CCA game. Game 2. Let E 12 be the event that the adversary issues a decapsulation query I * , C 1 , . . . , C n with C i,1 = C * i,1 for some i ∈ [n] and TCR (C 1,1 , . . . , C n,1 ) = TCR(C * 1,1 , . . . , C * n,1 ). By the target collision resistance of TCR we have Pr[E 12 ] ≤ negl(κ). We define Game 2 like Game 1 except assuming that E 12 never occurs in Game 2. It follows that
Game 3. We define Game 3 like Game 2, except that we sample K * R ← − {0, 1} nν uniformly at random. Note that both K * and U * are chosen uniformly random, thus we have
under the CBDH assumption. We prove this by a hybrid argument. To this end, we define a sequence of hybrid games H 0 , . . . , H n , such that H 0 equals Game 2 and H n equals Game 3. Then we argue that hybrid H i is indistinguishable from hybrid H i−1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} under the CBDH assumption. The claim follows, since n = n(κ) is a polynomial. We define H 0 exactly like Game 2. Then, for i from 1 to n, in hybrid H i we set the first iν bits of K * to independent random bits, and proceed otherwise exactly like in hybrid H i−1 . Thus, hybrid H n proceeds exactly like Game 3. Let E i denote the event that A outputs β such that β = β in H i . Suppose that
that is, the success probability of A in H 0 is not negligible close to the success probability in H n . Note that then there must exist an index i such that | Pr[
Suppose that there exists an algorithm A for which Equation (9) holds. Then we can construct an adversary B distinguishing the distributions ∆ bdh and ∆ rand , which by Lemma 2.3 is sufficient to prove security under the CBDH assumption in G. Adversary B receives a challenge D = (g, A, B, C, L, R) as input, guesses an index ∈ [n], which with probability at least 1/n such that | Pr[E −1 ] − Pr[E ]| = 1/poly(κ), and proceeds as follows: Initialization. A first outputs an identity I * ∈ Z p that it intends to attack. g r 1 , . . . , g r −1 , C, g r +1 , . . . , g rn ). Pick z R ← − Z p and defines h = X −I * g z . It gives A the system parameters mpk = (g, h, X, X , Y, F ). Note that the corresponding msk, which is unknown to B is a. Phase 1 -Private Key Queries. A issues up to Q e private key queries with the only restriction that I = I * . To respond to a private query of I ∈ Z p , B picks s R ← − Z p and sets
We claimed that sk is a valid private key for I. To see this, let s = s − b/(I − I * ). Then we have
I−I * = g s where s, s are uniform distributed in Z p . This matches the definition for a private key for I. Hence, sk is a valid private key for I. Phase 1 -Decapsulation Queries. Upon A issuing a decaptulation query I, C 1 , . . . , C n , B responds as follows. If I = I * , B uses the corresponding private key to handle it. Otherwise, B computes t = TCR (C 1,1 , . . . , C n,1 ) and tests the consistency of the ciphertext by checking
If the equality holds for all 1
. By the definition of Game 2 we know that when I = I * , if C i,1 = C * i,1 for some i ∈ [n] then t = t * . Therefore B can answer all decapsulation queries issued by A correctly. Challenge. To generate the challenge ciphertext
r * j , R) for i from + 1 to n. B samples uniform randomly bits U * ∈ {0, 1} nν , picks a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}. If β = 1, it gives A the challenge (C * , K * ). Otherwise it gives A the challenge (C * , U * ). Phase 2. In Phase 2, all the queries are responded the same way as in Phase 1 except the decapsulation query I * , C * will be rejected.
This completes the description of simulation. If D ∈ ∆ bdh we have K * = f gl (bdh(A, B, C), R). Thus A's view when interacting with B is identical to H −1 . If D ∈ ∆ rand , then A's view is identical to H . Thus B can use A to distinguish D ∈ ∆ bdh from D ∈ ∆ rand . According to Lemma 2.3, B further implies a PPT algorithm which can break the CBDH problem, which contradicts to the CBDH assumption.
C The proof of Scheme 2
Proof. We proceed in a sequence of games. We write (C * 1 , C * 2 , C * 3 ) to denote the challenge ciphertext with the corresponding key K * of identity I * , denote with U * the random key chosen by the IND-sID-CCA experiment, and set t * = TCR(C * 1 ). We start with a game where the challenger proceeds like the standard IND-sID-CCA game (i.e., K * is a real key and U * is a random key), and end up with a game where both K * and U * are chosen uniformly random. Then we show that all games are computationally indistinguishable under the CBDH assumption. Let W i denote the event that A outputs β such that β = β in Game i.
Game 1. Let E 01 be the event that the adversary issues a decapsulation query I * , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 with C 1 = C * 1 in Phase 1. Note that the probability that the adversary submits a decapsulation query such that C 1 = C * 1 before seeing the challenge ciphertext is bounded by Q d /p, where Q d is the number of decapsulation queries issued by A. Since Q d = poly(κ), we have Pr[E 01 ] ≤ Q d /p ≤ negl(κ). We define Game 1 exactly the same as Game 0 except assuming that E 01 never occurs in Game 1. It follows that
Game 3. We define Game 3 like Game 2, except that we sample K * 0 R ← − {0, 1} nν uniformly random. Note that both K * 0 and K * 1 are chosen uniformly random, thus we have
Suppose that there exists an algorithm A for which Equation (10) holds. Then we can construct an adversary B distinguishing the distributions ∆ bdh and ∆ rand , which by Lemma 2.3 is sufficient to prove security under the CBDH assumption in G. Adversary B receives a challenge D = (g, A, B, C, L, R) as input, guesses an index ∈ [n], which with probability at least 1/n that | Pr[E −1 ] − Pr[E ]| = 1/poly(κ), and proceeds as follows: Initialization. A first outputs an identity I * ∈ Z p that it intends to attack. . . , Y n , F ). The corresponding msk, which is unknown to B is a. The function F is essentially of the form
Phase 1 -Private Key Queries. A issues up to Q e private key queries with the only restriction that I = I * . To respond to a private query for identity I ∈ Z p , B generates sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) as follows: for sk algorithm B picks s R ← − Z p and sets
for sk i where i ∈ [n]\{ }, B picks a random integer s i ∈ Z p and sets
I−I * = g s where s , s are uniform in Z p . This matches the definition for a private key for I. Hence, sk is a valid private key for I. Phase 1 -Decapsulation Queries. Upon A issuing a decaptulation query I, C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , B responds as follows. If I = I * , B uses the corresponding private key to handle it. Otherwise, B computes t = TCR(C 1 ) and tests the consistency of the ciphertext by checking
If the equality holds,
. By Game 2 we know that when I = I * , if C 1 = C * 1 then we have t = t * . Therefore B can answer all decapsulation queries issued by A correctly. Challenge. B sets C * 1 = C (which implicitly assigns r = c), C * 2 = C d , and C * 3 = C z . The challenge ciphertext is C * = (C * 1 , C * 2 , C * 3 ). Note that this is a consistent ciphertext since we have (X t * X ) r = (g d ) r = C d and F (I * ) r = (g z ) r = C z . Then B samples i − 1 uniformly random groups of ν bits K * 1 , . . . , K * −1 , sets K * = L, K * i = f gl (e(X, C * 1 ) y i , R) for i from + 1 to n. B samples U * ∈ {0, 1} nν uniformly at random, and picks a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}. If β = 1, it gives A the challenge (C * , K * ). Otherwise it gives A the challenge (C * , U * ). Phase 2. In Phase 2, all the queries are responded in the same way as in Phase 1 except the decapsulation query I * , C * will be rejected.
This finishes the description of simulation. If D ∈ ∆ bdh we have K * = f gl (bdh(A, B, C), R), A's view is identical to H −1 . If D ∈ ∆ rand , A's view is identical to H . Thus B can use A to distinguish D ∈ ∆ bdh from D ∈ ∆ rand . According to Lemma 2.3, B further implies a PPT algorithm which can break the CBDH problem, which contradicts to the CBDH assumption.
D The proof of Generalized Scheme 1
Proof. We proceed in a sequence of games. We write C * = (C * 1 , . . . , C * n 2 ) to denote the challenge ciphertext with the corresponding key K * of I * , denote with U * the random key chosen by the IND-sID-CCA experiment, and set t * = TCR(C * 1,1 , . . . , C * n 2 ,1 ). We start with a game where the challenger proceeds as the standard IND-sID-CCA game (i.e., K * is a real key and U * is a random key), and end up with a game where both K * and U * are chosen uniformly random. Then we show that all games are computationally indistinguishable under the CBDH assumption. Let W i denote the event that A outputs β such that β = β in Game i. We prove this by a hybrid argument. To this end, we define a sequence of hybrid games H 0 , . . . , H n , such that H 0 equals Game 2 and H n equals Game 3. Then we argue that hybrid H i is indistinguishable from hybrid H i−1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} under the CBDH assumption. The claim follows, since n = n(κ) is a polynomial. We define H 0 exactly like Game 2. Then, for i from 1 to n, in hybrid H i we set the first iν bits of K * to independent random bits, and proceed otherwise exactly like in hybrid H i−1 . Thus, hybrid H n proceeds exactly like Game 3. Let E i denote the event that A outputs β such that β = β in H i . Suppose that
that is, the success probability of A in H 0 is not negligible close to the success probability in Suppose that there exists an algorithm A for which Equation (11) holds. Then we can construct an adversary B distinguishing the distributions ∆ bdh and ∆ rand , which by Lemma 2.3 is sufficient to prove security under the CBDH assumption in G. Adversary B receives a challenge D = (g, A, B, C, L, R) as input, guesses an index ∈ [n], which with probability at least 1/n such that | Pr[E −1 ]−Pr[E ]| = 1/poly(κ). Let (ī,j) be the unique tuple that satisfies (ī−1)×n 1 +j = , B proceeds as follows: Initialization. A first outputs an identity I * ∈ Z p that it intends to attack.
Setup. B first picks r j R ← − Z p for j ∈ [n 2 ]\j, then sets t * = TCR(g r 1 , . . . , g rj −1 , C, g rj +1 , . . . , g rn 2 ).
B then picks d R ← − Z p , and sets X = A = g a , X = X −t * g d , Yī = B = g b ; picks y i R ← − Z p and sets Y i = g y i for i ∈ [n 1 ]\ī. It gives A the system public parameters mpk = (g, h, X, X , Y 1 , . . . , Y n 2 , F ). Note that the corresponding msk, which is unknown to B is a. Phase 1 -Private Key Queries. A issues up to Q e private key queries with the only restriction that I = I * . To respond to the query of I ∈ Z p , for skī algorithm B picks sī Phase 1 -Decapsulation Queries. Upon A issuing a decaptulation query I, C 1 , . . . , C n 2 , B responds as follows. If I = I * , B uses the corresponding private key to handle it. Otherwise, B computes t = TCR (C 1,1 , . . . , C n 2 ,1 ) and then tests the consistency of the ciphertext by checking e(C j,1 , X t X ) ? = e(g, C j,2 ) ∧ e(C j,1 , F (I)) ? = e(g, C j,3 )
If the equality holds for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 , then B computes K = (K 1 , . . . , K n ) as follows. Suppose e = (i − 1) × n 1 + j,
1. If i =ī, set K e = f gl (e(X, C j ) y i , R). 2. If i =ī, compute X j := (C j,2 /C d j,1 ) 1/(t−t * ) = (X r j (t−t * ) g r j d /g r j d ) 1/(t−t * ) = X r j = dh(X, C j,1 ), set K e = f gl (e( X j , Yī), R).
By the definition of Game 2 we know that when I = I * , if C j,1 = C * j,1 for some j ∈ [n 2 ] then t = t * . Therefore B can answer all decapsulation queries issued by A correctly. Challenge. To generate the challenge ciphertext C * = (C * 1 , . . . , C * n 2 ), for j = [n 2 ]\j, B sets C * j = (C * j,1 , C * j,2 , C * j,3 ) = (g r j , (X t * X ) r j , F (I * ) r j ); for C * = C z . Note that this is a consistent ciphertext since we have (X t * X ) rj = (g d ) rj = C d and F (I * ) rj = (g z ) rj = C z . Then B samples − 1 uniformly random groups of ν bits K * 1 , . . . , K * −1 , sets K * = L. For ≤ e ≤ n, B generates K e in a similar way as it did when answering decapsulation queries, that is, suppose e = (i − 1) × n 1 + j, if i =ī, set K e = f gl (e(X, C j ) y i , R); if j =j, set K e = f gl (e(X, Y i ) r j , R). B samples U * ∈ {0, 1} nν uniformly at random, then picks a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}. If β = 1, it gives A the challenge (C * , K * ). Otherwise it gives A the challenge (C * , U * ). Phase 2. In Phase 2, all the queries are responded in the same way as in Phase 1 except the decapsulation query I * , C * will be rejected.
This completes the description of simulation. If D ∈ ∆ bdh we have K * = f gl (bdh(A, B, C), R), A's view when interacting with B is identical to H −1 . If D ∈ ∆ rand , A's view is identical to H . Thus B can use A to distinguish D ∈ ∆ bdh from D ∈ ∆ rand . According to Lemma 2.3, B further implies a PPT algorithm which can break the CBDH problem, which contradicts to the CBDH assumption.
